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A Permanent Resolution Mechanism
of Cultural Property Disputes
By Maria Granovskyl

I.

INTRODUCTION

Disputes regarding cultural property' are a common irritant in
international relations. These disputes stir great passions because they touch

Dr. Granovsky is an associate with the Intellectual Property Group at Morris, Nichols, Arsht &
Tunnell, L.L.P. in Wilmington, Delaware. Dr. Granovsky received her Ph.D. from the University of
Toronto, Toronto, Canada, in 1999 and her J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center,
Washington D.C., in 2005. Special thanks to Dr. Cynthia Bouchez of Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein &
Fox, P.L.L.C. and Ms. Claire Ford of Morris Nichols for critical reading of the manuscript. The
opinions expressed in this article are Dr. Granovsky's and do not reflect the opinions of Morris
Nichols.
1. Definitions of cultural property vary. Article I of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property provides the following definition:
[T]he term "cultural property" means property which, on religious or secular grounds, is
specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory,
history, literature, art or science and which belongs to the following categories:
a. Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and
objects ofpalaeontological [sic] interest;
b. property relating to history, including the history of science and technology and
military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and
artists and to events of national importance;
c. products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandestine) or of
archaeological discoveries;
d. elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which have
been dismembered;
e. antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and
engraved seals;
f. objects of ethnological interest;
g. property of artistic interest, such as:
i. pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any support
and in any material (excluding industrial designs and manufactured articles
decorated by hand);
ii. original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material;
iii. original engravings, prints and lithographs;
iv. original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2007

1

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 2

upon questions of cultural identity, religion, and national history. These
passions in turn harden the positions taken by the parties involved, retarding
resolution and increasing resentment. Indeed,2 some such disputes have
remained unresolved for decades if not centuries.
Because most cultural property disputes are international, they implicate
a variety of legal norms and raise complex choice of law questions, such as
conflicting evidentiary standards and statutes of limitations. Therefore,
"traditional legal norms are ' 3often incapable of addressing the special
problems of cultural property."
Even when international law can provide a correct legal answer as to the
ownership of a specific object, that answer, by its nature, often cannot take
into account the political, moral, and ethical climate into which a dispute
was born or in which it continues to exist. Therefore, while legally correct,
this answer may be deemed illegitimate by one or more of the parties
involved, all but guaranteeing that this conflict will continue to simmer or
that future relations between the parties will suffer.4
Despite the frequency of cultural property disputes, there is currently no
permanent and universally acceptable framework for their resolution.
Rather, each dispute is approached on an ad hoc basis.5 Even though each
dispute presents a unique set of circumstances, there is sufficient
commonality within the class of such disputes to make it amenable to a
standardized, if flexible, system of resolution.
This paper proposes one such possible system. The proposed system
would include a new permanent international organization dedicated solely
to the settlement of cultural property disputes. Under its auspices, a process
would exist to guarantee a binding solution while allowing the parties
maximum autonomy in resolving their conflict. Both goals are achieved by

h. rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of
special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collections
i. postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
j. archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives;
k. articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical
instruments.
UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/htmleng/page2.shtml (last visited Sept. 30,
2007).
2. For a discussion of cultural property disputes generally, see John Henry Merryman, Two
Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L LAW 831 (1986), available at
http://www.asil.org/ajil/v80831.pdf. See also KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, RESOLUTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES (The Int'l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2004).
3. Tjaco T. van den Hout, Introduction to RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES,
supra note 2, atXV.
4. See id.
5. Id. at XIV.
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structuring the process as a series of escalating steps-from negotiation
through mediation to arbitration-while building in choice as to the form
that each step would take. A hypothetical case study of a current real-life
cultural property dispute involving four nations and certain individuals
illustrates this system.
II.

CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES

Cultural property disputes take multiple forms. 6 They concern, singly
or in combination, questions of ownership, location and stewardship.7 Any
of these disputes may have added layers of complexity such as violations of
export controls or a bona fide purchase somewhere along the chain of
possession.
There are disputes over stolen objects,8 and objects that were acquired
in a manner that is primafacie lawful. 9 There are disputes over the handling
of a cultural heritage of an invaded nation by the invader,' 0 and the handling
of cultural property by a government internally."
And then, there are
disputes still raging over war-time plunder.
It is important to acknowledge that each dispute is a microcosm of
greater interests: a poor country that has become a source of antiquities will
not view the dispute in the same manner as a wealthy consumer country
where, arguably, there are greater resources available to conserve and
preserve these antiquities. Each interest is also shaped by historical
considerations such as relations between former colonizers and their
colonies and traditional allies and enemies. Nor are the interests of each
party fixed from dispute to dispute: Russia, for example, is not only a source
country for religious icons, but a consumer country for cultural property
gained during World War II, or now bought with its abundant petro-dollars.

6.

Katherine Last, Issues of Definition, in RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY DISPUTES,

supra note 2, at 53, 65-74.
7. Id. at 77.
8. Id. at 66, discussing Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (Byzantine mosaics stolen from a church in
Cyprus and purchased by an arts dealer in the duty free zone of the Geneva airport).
9. Id. at 68-69. Examples of such disputes is the case of Gentili di Giuseppe, whose art
collection was seized and sold at auction after his family had fled France; and the case of a painting,
currently at the Tate Gallery, that was sold by a Jewish World War II refugee to avoid starvation. Id.

10. Id. A recent example of such controversy is the handling and safeguarding of Iraqi
antiquities by U.S. forces since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
11. For example, the Taliban's destruction of the Buddha statutes of Bamyan. Id.
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A good example of how complex cultural disputes are and how they
become so is the one surrounding the Schliemann collection, to which
Russia, Germany, Turkey, and Greece lay claim.
A. A Case Study: To whom does the Schliemann Collection belong?
i.

History

In 1871, Heinrich Schliemann was on a mission to find Troy, the fabled
city immortalized in Homer's Iliad and Odyssey.12 His search focused on
Hisarlik, a site on the Trojan plane (also known as the Troad), located in
Turkey. That site was recommended to him by Frank Calvert, a British
diplomat and an avid amateur archaeologist, who spent the majority of his
life on the Troad and who owned part of the site at Hisarlik. In return for the
right to excavate on his lands, Calvert asked for half of the objects the
Schliemann would find there. 3
During the excavation, Schliemann inadvertently dug deeper than the
stratum of the late bronze age (where Troy would have been expected to be)
to find a city of a much earlier period. There he found multiple artifacts,
including many intricate pieces of gold jewelry. Believing that he had found
Troy, Schliemann dubbed the collection of artifacts "the treasure of Priam"
in honor of the Trojan king immortalized by Homer. 14
Schliemann crated "the treasure of Priam" and smuggled it in its entirety
out of Turkey into Greece. In doing so, he violated the terms of his Turkish
excavation permit, which required him to hand over a portion of his findings
to the state, as well as a ministerial decree prohibiting the removal of any
artifacts from Turkey, including Schliemann's rightful share. The Turkish
government sued Schliemann in the Greek courts, demanding the return of
half of his Troy collection, but not raising the issue of illegal exportation.
The suit was settled.' 5
The text of the final settlement is not available, and we are left to rely on
Schliemann's claim that Turkey relinquished all rights to the treasure in
return for a one-time monetary payment. Events subsequent to the
settlement, however, tend to bear out his account. For example, Turkey

12.

See SUSAN HEUCK ALLEN, FINDING THE WALLS OF TROY: FRANK CALVERT AND

HEINRICH SCHLIEMANN AT HISARLIK (1999), for a history of the excavation of Troy.
13. Id. See also Donald Fyfe Easton, The Excavation of the Trojan Treasures, and Their
History up to the Death of Schliemann in 1890, in THE SPOILS OF WAR (Elizabeth Simpson ed.,
1997).
14. See ALLEN, supra note 12.
15. Easton, supra note 13, at 197-98.
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issued a new permit to Schliemann for his 1878-79 excavations under terms
similar to the original permit. 16 In addition, although the collection was
exhibited openly and notoriously in London and in Berlin from 1878
until
7
1939, Turkey made no further attempt to reclaim it until the present. 1
Schliemann eventually made a gift of the collection to the German
people.18
During World War II, Berlin's Museum ffir Vor-und
Fruhgeschichte, the permanent exhibitor of the collection since 1881, took
several steps to protect it.' 9 Days before the war broke out, the collection
was transferred to the ground floor of the museum, inventoried, and crated.
It was later transferred to the deep vault of the Prussian State Bank, and
again to bunkers specifically designed to protect Berlin's cultural treasures
where it remained for the duration of the war. E2
In 1945, as the allies were closing in on Berlin, the Western allies
agreed to hold back and allow the Red Army to enter Berlin first. 2' This
arrangement allowed the Soviets to collect and ship vast repositories of
artworks, antiquities, archives, and libraries back to the Soviet Union with
impunity.22 Among these treasures was the Schliemann collection, which
was removed from Germany in May or June of 1945, after the war had
ended.23
ii.

The Current Status of the Collection

The fate of the collection was not officially verified until 1991, when
Soviet museum curators acknowledged that the Soviet Union still possessed
cultural property repositories taken from Germany at the end of World War
16.

Id.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Klaus Goldmann, The Trojan Treasures in Berlin: The Disappearanceand Search for
the Objects after World War I, in THE SPOILS OF WAR 200, 200-02 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997).

20.

Id. at 200. These bunkers were constructed of steel and concrete and were optimally air-

conditioned.

Throughout the war, the museum collections stored in these bunkers suffered only

minor damage and losses, even though the bunkers were subjected to continual air raids. Id. at 201.
21.

See STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER AND BERLIN 1945: THE DECISION TO HALT AT

THE ELBE 66-67, 88-89 (2000).
22. See Andrea Gattini, Restitution by Russia of Works ofArt Removed from German Territory
at the End of the Second World War, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 67, 67-68 (1996).
23. See ALLEN, supra note 12. The removal of cultural property was coordinated by the

Soviet Trophy Commission. The Trophy Commission was established by express orders from
Joseph Stalin, and its mission was the removal of European art collections and state and private
libraries in reparation for the suffering inflicted by the Nazis on the Soviet people. Id.

29
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This revelation touched off a new round of international soul-searching
regarding the status and appropriate disposition of cultural property looted
and pillaged in wartime.25
Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, maintains that it holds
11.24

legal title to the Schliemann collection on the basis of the following four
legal theories.26 First, citing the act of state doctrine, Russia asserts that

upon victory, the Soviet Union became the successor to the German state,
thereby becoming the rightful owner of the Schliemann collection.27
Alternatively, Russia cites the doctrine of prescription, arguing that the

Soviet Union rescued the Schliemann collection for all mankind and that the
passage of time has made the Schliemann collection Russian cultural
patrimony, much like the passage of time has made the Elgin Marbles
Russia further supports its position by the
British cultural patrimony.
principle of repose, which holds that the status quo should be upheld. 29 The
status quo, of course, would see the Schliemann collection remain where it

is.30 Finally, Russia also argues that, as a victorious power, it is allowed
legitimate war reparations for the barbarity of the Germans towards the
Soviet people and for the loss of its own cultural property, and that the
taking of the Schliemann collection constitutes nothing more than such
reparations. 3
Germany counters that Russia has agreed to repatriate the Schliemann
collection by concluding two bilateral treaties with Germany that relate to
the return of cultural property. It also argues that Russia is obligated to
repatriate the collection by customary international law and by the Hague

24. See S. Shawn Stephens, The Hermitage and Pushkin Exhibits: An Analysis of the
Ownership Rights to Cultural Properties Removed from Occupied Germany, 18 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
59, 61 (1995). See also Stephen K. Urice, Claims to Ownership of the Trojan Treasures, in THE
SPOILS OF WAR (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997).
25. See Stephens, supra note 24, at 60.
26. See id. at 93.
27. See Stephens, supra note 24, at 93-96.
28. See id. at 96-98.
29. See id. at 98.
30. See id.
31. See Mark Boguslavsky, Legal Aspects of the Russian Position in Regard to the Return of
Cultural Property, in THE SPOILS OF WAR 188-89 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997); Stephens, supra
note 24, at 98-105. In a May 18, 2006 interview with Interfax, Irina Antonova, the General Director
of the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts, where the Schliemann collection is currently housed, stated
that the collection "was taken from Germany to the USSR as compensatory restitution for losses
suffered by the Soviet Union during WWII" and that it is now "federal property and an inseparable
part of the Russian Federation's museum collection." Interview with Irina Antonova, General
Director, Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts, in St. Petersburg, Russia (May 18, 2006).

30
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Convention of 1907, to which it is a signatory. 32' As an indication of its
belief in the strength of its position, Germany has stated that it is willing to
resolve this dispute in the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") or through
arbitration. 3
In addition to Germany and Russia, both Turkey and Greece lay claim to
the collection on the basis of their historical ties to it. 34 Both countries view
this dispute from the point of view of source countries for antiquities. Both
have made great efforts to protect their heritage by limiting exportation and
pursuing the return of antiquities already exported. Turkey claims that the
artifacts removed by Schliemann (both the collection now in Russia and
other artifacts dispersed in some forty other collections found throughout the
world) should be reunified and returned to the original excavation site.35
Turkey argues that humanity's effort to study ancient civilizations would be
best advanced by studying the objects in situ.36 Greece bases its claim on it
being the historical and cultural heir of the ancient Greeks.3 7
Viewing these competing claims through the prism of international law,
there is little doubt that Germany is the rightful owner of the Schliemann
collection. As an initial matter, the Turkish and Greek claims appear to have
scant legal support. First, the Turkish claim is likely barred by the
settlement with Schliemann in 1874 and the subsequent failure to state a
further claim even though the collection was publicly exhibited. The public
exhibition will also act to bar the Greek claims. And even if not so barred,

32. A legal dispute should be resolved in accordance with the law contemporaneous with it.
Island of Palmas (Neth. v. USA), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 845 (Per. Ct. Arb. 1928). Thus, although
international law regarding cultural property has developed substantially since 1945, these new

developments are immaterial for the interpretation of the dispute regarding Schliemann's collection.
33. See Urice, supra note 20, at 205. Germany has also countered the Russian arguments that
are based on the act of state doctrine and on the doctrine of prescription. See Stephens, supra note
24. Germany asserts that its occupation by the Allies did not result in the loss of its sovereignty and

that, therefore, the act of state doctrine is not applicable. See id. Germany further points out that the
bunker in which the Schliemann collection was housed at the end of the war was located in the
British Sector where, by definition, the Soviet Union did not govern. See id. Finally, Germany
disputes Russia's argument that the Soviet Union acted to save the collection by removing it from
Germany: because hostilities had already ended, the collection was no longer in danger. See id.
34. In addition to the nation-states with claims to the collection, it has been reported that Frank

Calvert's American and British heirs may sue for the return of certain objects from Schliemann's
collection because these objects appear to have come from Calvert's land. See Susan Heuck Allen,
Calvert's Heirs Claim Schliemann Treasure, ARCHAEOLOGY, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 26-7.
35. See Stephens, supra note 24.
36. See id.
37. See Easton, supra note 13, at 197-98.
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the Greek claim is weakened by the fact that the artifacts were not found on

Greek soil.38 Thus, even though both Turkish and Greek claims are not
morally or ethically frivolous, they will be given no consideration under a
framework that is not designed to account for anything other than the legal
dimension of the dispute.
The claims of Russia and Germany cannot be so easily dismissed.
Russia and Germany have signed two bilateral treaties regarding repatriation
The 1990 Treaty on Good-Neighborliness,
of cultural property.39
Partnership and Cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union
provides that the parties "agree that lost or unlawfully transferred art

treasures which are located in their territory will be returned to their owners
or their successors., 40 The 1992 German-Russian Agreement on Cultural
Cooperation provides that the contracting parties "agree that lost or

unlawfully transferred cultural property which is located in their sovereign

territory will be returned to its owners or their successors. 41 Russia has
insisted that both clauses relate to a comprehensive settlement of all cultural
patrimony disputes between the two nations. Nowhere in the treaties,
however, are the terms of these clauses defined in a manner consistent with
Russia's interpretation.42
The treaties instead should be evaluated in accordance with the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which both Germany and Russia are
signatories. The Vienna Convention holds that "[e]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good

38. Calvert's heirs are faced with additional hurdles. As an initial matter, the agreement
between Schliemann and Calvert called for a division of the artifacts found on Calvert's land. Yet, it
is well documented that Schliemann has found at least some of the artifacts in areas that did not
belong to Calvert. This, coupled with the lack of documentation as to the exact axes that are now in
the Schliemann collection may well have been Schliemann's rightful share. An added complication
is the fact that in civil code countries, such as Germany, a thief can pass good title. See Steven F.
Grover, Note, The Need for Civil-Law Nations to Adopt Discovery Rules in Art Replevin Action: A
Comparative Study, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1431, 1432 (1992). Thus, regardless of whatever questions
there may be about Schliemann's rights to the collection, his gift of it to the Museum ftir Vor- ind
Fruhgeschichte created good title. See id.
39. Stephan Wilske, International Law and the Spoils of War: To the Victor the Right of
Spoils?, 3 UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF. 223, 270 (1998).
40. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Good-Neighborliness,Partnershipand Cooperation, reprintedin THE SPOILS OF WAR
305 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997); see also Wilske, supra note 40, at 270.
41. Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Government of the Russian Federation on Cultural Cooperation, reprinted in THE SPOILS OF WAR
307 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997); see also Wilske, supra note 40, at 271.
42. Acting on its understanding of the treaties, Germany has repatriated (and Russia has
accepted) works of art as they were discovered without waiting for a comprehensive settlement. See
Wilske, supra note 40.

32
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'
faith. 43
Further, it mandates that "[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty ...
The Vienna
Convention also provides rules for interpreting treaties: "A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose. 45 The plain language of the treaties between Russia and
Germany supports Germany's contention that Russia has committed itself to
repatriating the Schliemann collection. Russia's belated insistence that it is
not obligated under the treaties, until and unless comprehensive settlement is
reached, violates its obligation under the Vienna Convention to deal in good
faith.
Germany's position is further supported by customary international law.
Customary international law arises out of consistent and widely practiced
customs adopted by states when such compliance is coupled with a sense of
legal obligation.46 While victory in battle was long regarded as carrying
with it the right to the spoils, 47 treaties providing for some limited return of
cultural property to its rightful owners upon cessation of hostilities were
concluded as early as the 17th century. 48 The growing respect for an
enemy's cultural property rights is evident in the terms of the French
Surrender after Napoleon's defeat. 4 9 The Conference of Vienna, following
the principle of restitution in integrum ("restitution to the previous
condition"),5 ° forced France to return the cultural property that it plundered
during the Napoleonic Wars.51 By 1863, when the Lieber Code first
codified the rules of war, the protected status of cultural property was widely
acknowledged. 52
Further, as a signatory to the Hague Convention of 1907, Russia has
expressly agreed that it would be unlawful to "destroy or seize the enemy's

43. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
availableat http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/I -1969.pdf.
44. Id.at art. 18.
45. Id.atart.
31.
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
47. The seizure of cultural property from the enemy was done as much to enrich and honor the
victor as to humiliate the vanquished. Indeed, it was the custom both in ancient Greece and in
ancient Rome to plunder and take away artworks. See Wilske, supra note 40, at 241-42.
48. Id. at 243.
49. Id.at 246.
50. Id. at 257.
51. Id.

52.

Id. at 246-49.
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property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war.",5 3 Because the Schliemann collection was taken after
cessation of hostilities between the Allies and Germany, its removal clearly
violated the Hague Convention.
Yet, in the current environment, even though Germany has the strongest
legal claim to the collection, it is far from certain that Russia will relinquish
its rights and repatriate it to Germany for two reasons. First, Russian
emotions still run high over the destruction and looting of their own cultural
property, not to mention the enormous human cost, wrought by the Nazi
invasion.5 4 Any discussion regarding the repatriation of German cultural
property is met with a storm of indignation, as many consider the war booty
taken from Germany at the end of World War II to be but a small measure of
restitution for Germany's war crimes.55 Second, there is very little pressure
that can be brought to bear on Russia to return German cultural property,
especially in view of Russia's current position as a dominant supplier of oil
to all of Western Europe.
Russia's present strength brings up an important issue: as is common in
cultural property disputes, the nation states that are parties to this dispute are
bound by an intricate web of relations that has developed since the end of
World War II. For example,

53.
1907, 36
property.
54.
55.

Id. at 249. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
Stat. 2277. The Convention also prohibits pillaging, including the taking of private
See Wilske, supra note 40, at 227.
Id, at 257-58.
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(a) Germany is currently Russia's
biggest trading partner and its
56
largest foreign investor;
(b) Turkey is striving to gain entry into the European
Union, of
57
which Germany and Greece are members;
(c) Millions of Turks live in Germany as guest-workers; their
integration into German society has been slow to non-existent,
partly due to the difficulties Turkish workers face in obtaining

German citizenship;

8

(d) Turkey, Greece and Germany are members of NATO;5 9 and

(e) Turkey and Greece are overcoming generations of simmering
ethnic and religious conflicts.60
III.

A PROPOSED

SYSTEM FOR THE RESOLUTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
DISPUTES

A growing body of research suggests that the parties' degree of
satisfaction with the outcome of a dispute is directly correlated with the

56. See Mark A. Smith, The Russian, German and Polish Triangle, in RUSSIAN SERIES
(Conflict Studies Research Centre eds., 2005), available at www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/
document-listings/russian/05%2861%29 MAS.pdf.
57. See Maureen Freely, A Nation in Search of an Identity, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 22, 2004,
at 31.
58. See Hannah Cleaver, Our Turkish Workers Mistake, by Schmidt, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London) Nov. 25, 2004 at 18, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=
/news/2004/11/25/wturk25.xml.
59. See
North
Atlantic
Treaty
Organization,
NATO
Member
Countries,
http://www.nato.int/structur/countries.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
60. See Warren Hoge, Cyprus Greeks and Turks Agree on Plan to End 40-Year Conflict, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at Al.
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degree of autonomy that the parties have in settling the dispute. 6 In a
traditional adversarial system, where there is necessarily a winner and a
loser, the degree of dissatisfaction, for at least one of the parties, is quite
high. In contrast, a negotiation process often leads to an expansion of the
parties' options, allowing the parties
to reach a non-zero-sum outcome that
62
would allow all parties to buy in.
Alternative dispute resolution processes are being successfully applied
to complex intra and international disputes. The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in South Africa, and work in Rwanda, Ireland, and former
Yugoslavia, to name but a few, are recent examples of non-adjudicatory
processes for conflict resolution. Each of these processes is successful
partly because it is molded to fit the specific conflict and partly because it
looks to a holistic solution, rather than the merely legal one.
A successful dispute resolution mechanism for cultural property
disputes should be designed to take into account the following
considerations:
(a) Buy-in from the parties. The resolution of this dispute should
be seen as legitimate by all of the parties. Otherwise, it is likely
that the parties would continue to wrangle over the Schliemann
collection, or that the parties will try to compensate for their
disappointment through hardening positions in future disputes.
As discussed above, buy-in is directly correlated with perceived
party autonomy; therefore, a negotiated settlement is preferable
to an imposed one.
(b) Doing no harm to future relations among the parties, and
possibly even strengthening these relations, so that the parties
may resolve other conflicts with greater ease.
(c) Political cover. International obligations shared by multiple
nations have been shown to provide effective cover for actions
that otherwise would be politically untenable domestically.63
Fostering a similar sense of binding obligation through a treaty
61
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that establishes the dispute resolution system may help a party
take domestically-unpopular actions, especially if the system is
viewed as even-handed and able to help that same party to
recover its own cultural property.
Reliance on these principles in designing a dispute resolution system
yields the following model:
The proposal first entails a negotiated treaty among member states. This
treaty should set out threshold criteria for the disputes to be settled by this
mechanism (e.g., should stewardship disputes be addressed in this forum?);
the make-up of the permanent secretariat that will administer the dispute
resolution; whether or not member states can lodge a complaint on behalf of
individual citizens; and any mechanisms, such as economic sanctions, to
enforce compliance with the resulting settlement of the dispute. Once a
treaty is in force, a permanent secretariat is appointed and a roster of
technical experts is created.
A member state initiates proceedings by notifying the secretariat and the
opposing party (or parties) of its claim. A certification by the secretariat that
the claim meets the threshold criteria set forth in the treaty results in the
suspension of all litigation involving the cultural property in question. The
secretariat notifies all member states of the claim and the notification starts a
predetermined period during which any member state can register claims
relating to the object(s) in question. If a member state fails to register such a
claim during this period, it is permanently barred from raising the claim
again, unless new and material information, as determined by the secretariat,
becomes available at a later date. This strict limitation is intended to
encourage a comprehensive and permanent settlement of a given dispute.
The parties are allowed a predetermined length of time to negotiate a
settlement. Alternatively, the parties can jointly certify that they would
prefer to forgo the negotiation stage and proceed to mediation. Upon such
certification, the secretariat appoints the mediators and a panel of relevant
experts who are tasked with reporting on the technical, legal, historic, and
diplomatic aspects of the dispute. The reports are distributed to the parties
and to the mediators.
63. An example of this is the participation of both Turkey and Greece in NATO's campaign in
Bosnia. Despite historic allegiances to different warring factions in that conflict, the governments of
both Greece and Turkey were able to withstand political pressures domestically, and support
NATO's mission, by citing their obligations under the NATO charter. See, e.g., What is NATO?
Europe's Glue, Not Kremlin's Foe, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1997, at A 14.
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The mediators have free reign as to the structure of the mediation. In
designing the mediation process, however, they should seek input from the
parties and incorporate the parties' wishes if practicable. The role of the
mediators is to help the parties negotiate a settlement, partly by expanding
zones of possible agreement.
In that regard, the parties should be
encouraged to consider the particular dispute in the broader context of their
relations.
The mediation round is also of a predetermined duration. If an
agreement is not reached during this round, the secretariat appoints a panel
of arbitrators who are charged with issuing an award. In reaching their
decision, the arbitrators rely on the technical reports prepared for the
mediation round, a report by the mediators describing the mediation, and on
a single written submission per party that can include supporting documents
that a party chooses to produce. The single written submission rule is
designed to streamline the process and to avoid any discrepancies in
discovery or briefing procedures among the parties. In contrast to the role of
the mediators, who are tasked with exploring settlement options outside of
the immediate dispute, the arbitrators may only issue an award relating to the
objects in dispute and to monetary compensation. The treaty initially
negotiated among the member states may add further limitations on the
process by which the arbitrators reach their decision; for example, the treaty
may state that the award must be based solely on legal considerations in
keeping with specific treaties or conventions.
The arbitrators prepare an award, but do not publish it. The parties are
given an opportunity to either have the award published or to go back to a
round of mediation. Unless the parties choose unanimously to have the
award published, another round of mediation is undertaken.
If this
mediation round is unsuccessful, the arbitration award is published and binds
all of the parties to the dispute.
In order to encourage the parties to negotiate in good faith, the
arbitrators are permitted to take into consideration the behavior of the parties
during the entire process. Thus, if a party is perceived to be negotiating in
bad faith, for example by requesting the additional round of mediation
merely as an exercise in foot-dragging, the arbitrators have the authority to
assess punitive monetary damages against the party in addition to as much of
the proceeding's costs as they see fit.
This dispute resolution system would allow the parties with claims to
the Schliemann collection to consider unorthodox solutions that are
agreeable to all. By contrast, no such solutions can be explored by the
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International Court of Justice or by any other tribunal that is restricted solely
to the legal aspects of a dispute. 64
For example, the parties might resolve to address Turkey's argument
that modem archaeological practice emphasizes a global view of excavation
sites as a means for studying all aspects of ancient civilization. Today's
technology would allow exact replication of the objects for placement at the
original site. Such replicas could serve to provide information about the
positioning and functionality of these objects, much as models and
reconstructions are used in other scientific projects. In addition, the parties
might contract to provide free and unfettered access to the objects for
scientists and historians wishing to study them, wherever the objects
themselves end up and, in recognition of the significance of the artifacts to
the histories of the parties, a fund might be set up to provide stipends for
Greek, Turkish, German, and Russian scientists for the study of the artifacts
and the site. Alternatively, these nation states may choose to sponsor a joint
scientific group for such study.
As to the objects themselves, perhaps it would be possible to allow
certain duplicative artifacts to remain in Russia while repatriating the
remainder of the collection to Germany. Another option would be to exhibit
the collection on a permanently rotating schedule between Russia and
Germany, or among Russia, Germany, Greece, and Turkey, with the
acknowledgement that Germany is its lawful owner, and with a renewed
apology from Germany for the destruction of Russian cultural property. In
addition, it might be possible to create a revenue sharing arrangement, by
which the objects are exhibited in a special pavilion on the grounds of the
Berlin museum. The revenue from the exhibition could be shared with
Russia as a gesture of reconciliation. Further possible arrangements could
include the restitution of the collection to Germany in return for guaranteed
exhibitions of German cultural property in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Alternatively, Germany could undertake the restoration of war-damaged
Russian palaces and churches in return for the collection.65
Another possible solution could be the creation of a special museum,
administered by UNESCO, for the display of art and cultural property

64. See Stephens, supra note 24, at 64.
65. A similar proposal was made by Wolfgang Eichwede, Models of Restitution (Germany,
Russia, Ukraine), in THE SPOILS OF WAR 218-20 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997). See also Irina
Titova, Russia to Unveil Restored Amber Room, JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST E-MAIL NEWSLETTER,
May 13, 2003, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/718l-3.cfm.
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displaced during World War II, including the Schliemann collection.66 Such
a museum could exist either in a fixed, neutral location, or as a permanently
traveling exhibition that serves to remind the world of the price exacted by
war.

Whatever the outcome, it will be binding and enforceable. In contrast,
there is currently no international regime that would force the parties to
settle their disputes, nor one that would enforce a settlement if one is
reached. As discussed above, there is very little to compel Russia to
negotiate the fate of the Schliemann collection in good faith, and therefore,
under the present conditions it appears that the ownership of the collection
will be disputed for years to 6ome.
V.

CONCLUSION

A system of dispute resolution that allows maximal autonomy, while
threatening an imposed solution, may offer the best chance for a negotiated
settlement that would be palatable to all sides. A process for resolving
cultural property disputes that is guaranteed to lead to a binding outcome
raises the stakes for all participants and forces them to participate in direct
and mediated negotiations more purposely, rather than leave the outcome to
the arbitrators. This, in turn, raises the probability of reaching a legitimate
settlement that all parties can respect.

66. The writer Gunther Grass suggested a museum dedicated to plundered art housed in a
building built as a bridge over the river Oder, which marks the boundary between Poland and
Germany. See Wikipedia, Ginter Grass, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GiinterGrass
(last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
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